The Persian Gulf Strait Authority, an entity created by Iran to administer transits through the Strait of Hormuz, quietly released a major expansion of its "Non-Compliance List" on Monday, November 2, adding 114 vessels and doubling the total to 240 ships since the list was first introduced in August 2026 . The update represents the largest single expansion of the blacklist to date and signals Tehran's determination to assert control over the strategic waterway despite ongoing military tensions with the United States and its allies.
The PGSA reiterated its standing threat that vessels on the list "shall face restrictions on future passages, including fines, detention, or confiscation" . The authority states that listed ships failed to comply with Iranian demands to transit only through the northern channel near Iran and to clear their passage with Iranian authorities in advance. The expanded list now covers a broad cross-section of commercial shipping, though the composition reveals a calculated targeting strategy rather than a blanket approach.
According to analysis by risk intelligence firm Orbital, only 118 of the 240 listed vessels are crude oil tankers, with the remainder comprising LPG and LNG carriers, a handful of bulk carriers, and four containerships . The concentration on Gulf state national shipping companies is striking: vessels belonging to Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, Saudi Arabia's Bahri, ADNOC, Nakilat, QatarEnergy, and AD Ports account for 72 entries on the list, including 25 among the latest additions . This pattern suggests the PGSA is applying pressure on Iran's regional rivals while maintaining a veneer of regulatory justification.
The single largest targeted group, however, is vessels linked to South Korea's Sinokor. At least 29 Sinokor-related ships were among the 114 new additions, bringing the company's cumulative total to approximately 46 vessels—roughly half of its VLCC fleet . The PGSA had announced on October 27 that it would take "legal action" against Sinokor's entire fleet from November 1, accusing the company of committing the highest number of transit violations over the previous three months . Sinokor's dominance in Hormuz crude flows—carrying 37% of the strait's crude volume in September, more than the next three owners combined—likely explains why Iran singled it out for fleet-wide scrutiny .
The PGSA has extended its pressure beyond vessel operators. It warned cargo owners shipping to or from the Persian Gulf that they "must review the Non-Compliance List in order to avoid potential issues," and stated that any vessel cooperating with listed ships—including through ship-to-ship transfers or transshipment—will itself be added to the list . This secondary sanctions mechanism is designed to isolate listed vessels commercially, making it difficult for them to find willing counterparties for cargo operations or bunkering services.
The expansion of the blacklist coincides with continued attacks on commercial shipping in the region. UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that October concluded with another attack inside the Arabian Gulf, the sixth since October 7, alongside three attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, bringing the confirmed total to 18 since October 6 . Risk intelligence firm Orbital noted that at least nine of the newly listed vessels have already been attacked since the conflict began, according to IMO incident data . The PGSA has not specified what "legal action" entails beyond the standard fines, detention, or confiscation language, leaving ambiguity about whether enforcement will involve actual seizures or remain primarily a listing-based deterrent.
For the shipping industry, the practical effect of the expanded list is to raise the cost and complexity of Hormuz transits for any operator with vessels on the list. Charterers are likely to insert exclusion clauses for listed ships, and insurers may reassess war-risk premiums for vessels calling at Gulf ports. Sinokor has asked Iran for clarification, while the Korea Shipowners' Association has pushed back, noting that the vessels in question were sub-chartered to an overseas oil company and carried no South Korean crew . The standoff between Seoul and Tehran adds a diplomatic dimension to an already volatile maritime security environment, with Korean media reporting that Seoul is considering a wider naval mission near Hormuz .